Modeling Use of Force: Identifying the Decision Point

Law enforcement professionals are routinely required to make sudden life-or-death decisions. Officers in Use of Force (UOF) cases primarily rely on intuition - a combination of training and experience - to make objectively reasonable and ethical decisions. Officers tasked with solving complex and dynamic incidents frequently face new challenges and variables, making each incident unique from the last. It has long been understood that officers will resort to their training during critical incidents, yet relatively little training is given to help officers understand how UOF situations develop.

Officers typically receive a wealth of invaluable information during their time at the academy. However, that instruction is largely a loose collection of information and training, most of which have little or no method for integrating critically important elements into a cohesive system. This is especially true of UOF. While many academies have excellent instructors, students still regularly leave the academy without the foundational understanding required to patrol the streets safely and effectively. Officers need universally applicable training that provides them with a thorough understanding of violence. Knowing different force options and their applications is vital; knowing when to use them is arguably far more important.

THE SCIENCE

We developed the UOF Decision Point Model to aid officers in internalizing and visualizing the risk factors that might necessitate the application of force. The model assesses specific and universal context cues that indicate the likelihood of an incident escalating into a deadly force incident. Regardless of knowledge or skill level, officers typically rely on highly subjective methods in their responses. The subjective nature of those responses indicates that a significant number of officers are receptive to unnecessary and ambiguous stimuli, leading to excessive choice variables. The abundance of force options causes indecision, thereby reducing the effectiveness of decision-making, critical thinking, and response times (Drugowitsch et al., 2014).

The deterioration of a scene at the onset of a critical incident has shown us that officers primarily respond in one of two ways, strongly mirroring a "fight or flight" response. The first category, or the upper half, is a broad level of performance (from somewhat reasonable to stellar). The second, or lower half, is equally broad but with only minor variation in performance (little to no effective response or no response). The performance an officer displays appears to be almost linear with their level of knowledge and training during the upper portion (ie skill levels 5-10 of 10), with the lower portion dropping exponentially and quickly becoming 0.

Medium to Strong Performance - Top 50%

Little to No Performance - Bottom 50%

Officer Performance in Critical Incidents

Officers in the lower half are at extreme risk for developing or displaying symptoms of acute stress response (ASR). For research purposes, we will define ASR as "a failure to regulate one's emotions, resulting in uncontrolled spiraling and/or irrational decision-making." It appears that ASR comes from conflicting instincts and indecision. Officers typically resort to their training when a critical incident occurs. However, those with low levels of skill or knowledge lack confidence in their ability respond. Thus, officers enter a cycle of perpetually competing interests between overwhelming fear of survival and their attempts to instantaneously overcome their tactical deficiency. Low levels of knowledge, training, or stress tolerance are ripe conditions for ASR.

Even more experienced officers will often experience moderate symptoms following a critical incident. Officers all skill levels routinely experience minor symptoms like reduction of fine motor skills and shakiness. Highly trained officers appear to face some of the same obstacles, but see signficantly lessened symptoms that have delayed onset - they are often not observable until the conflict is resolved or until they leave the scene. The officer experiencing ASR appears to becomes trapped in a loop of indecision and disarray, resulting in disjointed actions like aimlessly circling when gunfire breaks out. This was most evident in an officer-involved shooting where 3 different officers arriving at the same place at the same time displayed 3 different responses. One officer displayed exceptional performance, another officer displayed mediocre performance while displaying moderate levels of stress response and shock with moderate interference, and the third officer ran in circles with confusion and no sense of direction due to a high degree of ASR.

The dynamic environment that patrol officers work in demands increased understanding of threat recognition, threat response, and human performance. We must establish two forms of response: training that results in intuitive response to stimulus and training that establishes systems and processes for officers to follow (whether by habit or memory recall). Intuitive trainign reduces the cognitive load that impairs officer. Systems, on the other hand, establish procedures and methods that minimize risk while also providing officers experiencing the decision spiral to find their footing. The more intuitive or systematic responses we can establish, the less likely is is for an officer to experience ASR . hat instills threat-based recognition and intuitive responses should reduce an officer's cognitive load and provide for remarkable improvements in officer performance. It might reduce the chance for ASR in some scenarios by allowing for increased reaction time, allowing officers to feel more in control and increasing confidence, or by raising the baseline high enough to establish the foundation for greater skills. We consider training to be any form of education, whether online or physical, that prepares an officer to perform a task. While physical training is vitally important, online or self-paced education can be equally important.

The addition of a well-constructed UOF system in combination with specific instruction and real-world application can create a near autonomic response. Have you ever taken a bite out of a burger and immediately craved a sode or beer? Heard your phone's notification and immediately checked it without thinking about it? Cringed when you heard the sound of an alarm clock, despite being in a different setting? Slammed on the brakes at a red light without a second thought? In psychology, this is referred to as classical conditioning. It is a natural response. This is how the UOF Framework will revolutionize law enforcement UOF training. Research shows that models are highly effective at simplifying complex constructs for more efficient learning and deeper understanding (Wilson et al., 2020). A UOF models could benefit rookies and veterans alike. Levels of training are the greatest indicator of performance, with notable reductions in performance as officers become more senior when lacking equivalent sufficient training (Baldwin et al., 2022). Therefore, experience alone is not a key component of a UOF program for improvement. While an improved system will benefit recruits and rookies more than others, everyone can benefit from improved UOF models and methods.

THE BENEFITS

A comprehensive understanding of UOF concepts results in more intentional and intuitive decisions, limiting or preventing the onset of ASR and the decision spiral. It also establishes a system for those to fall back on when they enter the decision spiral. Further, a systematic approach provides officers with additional tools to enhance report writing and courtroom testimony. The approach indirectly benefits both the officer and UOF review boards by providing for a more objective analysis, potentially protecting officers from unnecessary scrutiny. Finally, a systematic approach offers structured learning, better performance, and greater transparency for agencies seeking to help the community better understand UOF incidents. The development of rational systems and models benefits everyone - law enforcement agencies, their officers, and especially the community.

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THE USE OF FORCE MODEL

The UOF Escalation Model ©

The escalation point is not definitive. It will always requires context and officer discretion. However, it clearly outlines the typical stages in the development of violent confrontations.

1. Attitudes vary. Police encounters naturally lead to unhappy participants. Attitude alone is not a sole indicator of violence nor is it a requirement for violence. Subjects of police encounters may not show attitude at all. However, attitude is an important indicator of the risk level.

2. Non-compliance is the beginning of reasonable UOF application but requires the most discretion. It is vague concept that requires additional context, such as with passive and non-passive resistance.

3. Retreat is more clearly defined. While full flight is readily apparent, retreat should not be so strict. Simply backing away from an officer following a lawful command is enough to be considered retreat. It is an immediate indication that control of the scene is deteriorating.

4. Aggressive postures, such as a fighting stance, are at the top of the escalation point. They require immediate control of the scene and/or subject. Deescalation at this risk level may not be appropriate at this risk level.

The numbers simultaneously provide another view of the risk level. Each risk factor alone may result in no violence at all. However, a combination of risk factors exponentially increases the likelihood of violence as more risk factors are observed. The third risk factor especially shows a sharp rise, with each additional risk factor exponentially increasing the probability of violence. A cumulative total of 3 or more risk factors is cause for concern (expansive list pending).

The goal for any successful police encounter is to keep the risk levels low and within the de-escalation zone.

Factors within the yellow phase indicate potential violence whereas factors within the red phase indicate likely violence.

Therefore, deescalation tactics should integrate into the UOF Decision Point primarily within the yellow phase. Deescalation efforts in the red phase are likely too late and should only be employed where there is a reasonable establishment of control.

THE USE OF FORCE DECISION POINT

The UOF Decision Point

The Decision Point is highlighted in red. It is the point at which an officer must recognize and act to use commands or force to mitigate likely future violence. Failing to recognize the decision point is likely to result in further escalation. The precise point varies incident from incident and is sometimes less apparent than others. There are 3 separate methods for determining the Decision Point, however the most important is this:

ISOLATION OF TASKS

Another factor of human performance in critical incidents is the isolation of tasks or reconvergence. We are currently in the process of modeling target prioritization and target fixation. This section is one of the most difficult as it is minimally trained and likely requires higher levels of performance in order to overcome the physiological challenges present. One of our sample videos presents a third party entering the scene of a fleeing felon at gunpoint. Despite one officer yelling at the subject to get back, no party intervenes or isolates the subject until he clearly enters the scene. It is likely that the officer who should have intervened was also experiencing peripheral vision loss (tunnel vision) and auditory exclusion (muffled sounds).

DEVIATION

Another way to assess a red flag is the deviation method. Deviation is a noticeable difference in behavior or the environment. Deviations are your best friend when it comes to threat recognition and court testimony. sfas

TO BE CONTINUED

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References

Baldwin, S., Bennell, C., Blaskovits, B., Brown, A., Jenkins, B., Lawrence, C., McGale, H., nSemple, T., & Andersen, J. P. (2022). A reasonable officer: Examining the relationships among stress, training, and performance in a highly realistic lethal force scenario. Frontiers in Psychology, 12, Article 759132. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.759132

Drugowitsch, J., DeAngelis, G. C., Klier, E. M., Angelaki, D. E., & Pouget, A. (2014). Optimal multisensory decision-making in a reaction-time task. eLife, 3, e03005. https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.03005

Wilson, K. J., Long, T. M., Momsen, J. L., & Bray Speth, E. (2020). Modeling in the Classroom: Making Relationships and Systems Visible. CBE life sciences education, 19(1), fe1. https://doi.org/10.1187/cbe.19-11-0255